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[photo by Celeste]

Robert likes to tweak my nose a little by making references to the “fiction of intellectual property.” It seems clear that he means it in a dismissive way, but I’ve always been confused by this notion. Is the dismissive nature of the term because it is a “fiction” or because that fiction is in service of the similarly imagined materiality of intellectual artifacts and ownership?

Either way, I recognize that intellectual property is a fiction… in the same way much of our society is based on fictions like “free speech” and “civil rights.” These are all fictions used to frame cultural positions and actions which we view as advantageous or right. But we can be more specific than that, differentiating intellectual property from the broader category it shares with free speech: intellectual property is a fictive device. It’s a metaphor. And I’m not casually dismissive of metaphors (in fact, I’m not sure of the existence of much else).

I’m the last person anyone should turn to in order to defend the current system of copyright that is so obviously out of date and dangerously built on the foundation of intellectual property having a physical form. But I do not stand in opposition to the metaphor of intellectual property, which is something I think we need in order to have a working system that protects *and promotes* intellectual property in the second sense, as an artifact– with physically tangible manifestation or not– coming from, and of, human engagement with the world. What we need to protect isn’t really intellectual property, per se, but intellectual properties of expression.

Not recognizing intellectual property seems precisely retrograde, devaluing the creation of creative work of ephemeral and repeated instantiation at the very time that the power to create that kind of work is becoming available to everyone, like proscribing the ability to sell books just after Gutenberg has unveiled movable type.